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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________________________ 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 In 1989, Congress enacted § 212(k) of the Financial 
Institutions, Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
("FIRREA") (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (1989)), which 
provides: 
  
 Liability of directors and officers. -- A 
director or officer of an insured depository 
institution may be held personally liable for 
monetary damages in any civil action by, on 
behalf of, or at the request or direction of 
the Corporation . . . acting as conservator 
or receiver of such institution . . . for 
gross negligence, including any similar 
conduct or conduct that demonstrates a 
greater disregard of a duty of care (than 
gross negligence) including intentional 
tortious conduct, as such terms are defined 
and determined under applicable State law.  
Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or 
affect any right of the Corporation under 
other applicable law. 
 
12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (emphases added).  These interlocutory 
appeals, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1993), 
require us to address, with regard to this provision, two 
important questions of first impression in this circuit -- 
whether Congress, by its enactment of § 1821(k), (1) preempted 
state law, and/or (2) displaced federal common law actions that 
impose liability against directors and officers of insolvent 
federally insured depository institutions for conduct less 
culpable than gross negligence  (e.g. for ordinary negligence).  
 Section 1821(k) was passed by Congress in response to 
the enactment by various states, during the middle and late 
1980s, of lenient director liability statutes that generally 
provided directors with protection from gross negligence claims 
by limiting the grounds for liability to instances of reckless, 
willful and wanton boardroom misconduct.  This section of FIRREA 
permits the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") to seek recovery 
  
for such directors’ and officers’ gross negligence, while 
preserving the RTC’s rights under "other applicable law."  The 
particular questions raised by these appeals relate to whether 
Congress intended its reference to "other applicable law" to 
include state law and federal common law.   
 The appeals arise from cases brought by the RTC in the 
district court for the District of New Jersey on behalf of two 
insolvent depository institutions -- United Savings and Loan of 
Trenton, New Jersey ("United Savings") and City Federal Savings 
Bank ("City Federal") in Bedminster, New Jersey -- against 
certain former directors, officers and employees of these 
institutions ("the defendants").  The RTC brought claims under 
New Jersey law against former directors and officers of United 
Savings, a state chartered institution, (the "United Savings 
defendants") and federal common law claims against former 
directors and officers of City Federal, a federally chartered 
institution, (the "City Federal defendants").   
 In the United Savings action, the district court denied 
the defendants’ motion for dismissal and summary judgment as to 
the RTC's state law claims, concluding that § 1821(k) did not 
preempt any available actions for negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty under New Jersey law.  In the City Federal action, 
the district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
RTC's federal common law claims, concluding that the enactment of 
  
§ 1821(k) supplanted any available federal common law actions for 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.1 
 Courts of appeals that have considered these issues 
have concluded that § 1821(k) does not preempt state law,2 but 
that it does displace federal common law.3  We agree that this 
provision does not preempt any available state law negligence or 
fiduciary duty claims; however, we disagree with the conclusion 
that Congress intended by enactment of this statute to supplant 
the RTC’s ability to bring such actions under federal common law.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's order in the 
United Savings action and reverse the court's order in the City 
Federal action.  
 
 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
                     
 
   1  In referring to the supplanting or displacement of federal 
common law by federal statutory enactments, we refrain from the 
use of the term "preemption" so as to avoid any confusion with 
the alternative question of state law preemption and its various 
incidents, which is also addressed in this opinion.  See 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 101 S. Ct. 1784, 
1792 n.9 (1981) (illustrating the confusion which can result when 
the term "preemption" is used to refer to the displacement of 
federal common law by federal statutory enactments). 
    
2
  See FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 
(10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).  
    
3
  See RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295 (10th Cir. 1995); FDIC v. 
Bates, 42 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357 
(5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993). 
  
 The RTC, which has been appointed receiver of both 
United Savings and City Federal,4 brought these actions on behalf 
of both insolvent institutions pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) (1989), which provides that the RTC succeeds, 
upon its appointment as receiver, to all rights, titles, powers 
and privileges of such institutions, including claims arising out 
of the conduct of the institutions' directors and officers.  See 
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2054 
(1994) (recognizing that upon its appointment as receiver, the 
RTC "obtain[ed] the rights ‘of the insured depository 
institution’ that existed prior to receivership" (quoting 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i))).   
 A.  United Savings 
 In the United Savings action, the RTC alleges that the 
defendants failed to discharge their duties and obligations 
properly as directors, officers and members of United Bank's 
lending committees in connection with their consideration, 
approval and subsequent oversight of at least ten large 
acquisition, development and construction loans made to various 
borrowers between 1984 and 1990.  The RTC's complaint alleges 
breach of fiduciary duty and ordinary negligence under New Jersey 
law, as well as gross negligence under both New Jersey law and 
                     
    
4
  The Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision of the 
U.S. Treasury Department ("OTS") appointed the RTC as Receiver of 
both institutions, declaring City Federal insolvent on December 
7, 1989 and United Savings insolvent on June 15, 1990.    
  
§ 1821(k) in the approval of these loans, which allegedly 
resulted in a loss to United Savings of approximately $12.7 
million.   
 In particular, the RTC alleges that the defendants 
violated their duty of care by: (1) not hiring experienced 
lending underwriters or managers; (2) failing to reduce 
underwriting guidelines to a written form; (3) approving large 
loans after closing had already taken place; (4) maintaining 
inadequate appraisal procedures (often relying on appraisals 
provided by the borrower); (5) failing to maintain adequate 
internal controls; (6) not returning funds during the 
construction phase of commercial properties pending issuance of 
final occupancy permits; and (7) generally operating United 
Savings in an unsafe and unsound manner.  According to the RTC, 
the defendants continued these practices despite warnings by 
regulators, outside directors and accountants.  The RTC does not 
allege, however, any self-dealing, conflict of interest, bad-
faith or fraud on the part of the defendants. 
 In response to the RTC's complaint, the defendants 
moved to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, as 
to all New Jersey law claims based on ordinary negligence or 
breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that § 1821(k) preempts the 
RTC's right to bring such claims.  The district court entered an 
order denying defendants' motion and then granted the defendants' 
request to certify the court’s order for interlocutory appeal 
  
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1993).5  We granted the 
petition for leave to appeal.6   
                     
    
5
  While the question of federal common law preemption was 
also certified by the district court in the United Savings 
action, the RTC now concedes that, absent the application of 
§ 1821(k), only state law governs cases involving the liability 
of directors and officers of state-chartered institutions such as 
United Savings, while federal law exclusively governs such cases 
when the institution is federally chartered, like City Federal.  
This concession flows from the RTC’s recognition that the 
applicable law governing the liability of officers and directors 
for their stewardship of the corporation is the law of the 
jurisdiction of incorporation.  See RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 
1122 (7th Cir. 1994) (reaching this conclusion under the 
"venerable choice-of-law principle known as the internal affairs 
doctrine")  
    
6
  In denying the United Savings defendants' motion to 
dismiss all negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims under 
New Jersey law, the district court also rejected the defendants' 
argument that the business judgment rule as applied by New Jersey 
courts precludes any claims against independent, disinterested 
directors in the absence of an allegation of self-dealing, 
conflict of interest, bad faith or fraud.  While we certified 
this interesting and important issue for interlocutory appeal, we 
now conclude that it is not ripe for decision.  See Michota v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 755 F.2d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 1985) (declining 
to decide an issue certified as part of an interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to § 1292(b) and "remand[ing] it for resolution in the 
proper course of the remaining litigation").  Resolving this 
question at this stage of the litigation would require us to 
prescribe the scope of the protection provided by the business 
judgment rule to directors and officers under New Jersey case law 
without the benefit of greater factual development in this case.  
As the new Restatement of Corporate Governance recognizes, "[t]he 
application of duty of care standards is . . . [a] heavily fact 
oriented" analysis.  PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 cmt. h 
(1994) (emphasis added) ("The application of duty of care 
standards is . . . shaped by evidence of what can reasonably be 
expected of directors and officers in the context of the 
functioning of the modern corporation.").  Given the fact-
intensive nature of the law in this area, we conclude that the 
preferable course is to permit the district court's order denying 
the United Savings defendants' motion for summary judgment to 
stand so that greater factual development can occur.  This course 
  
 B.  City Federal 
 In the City Federal action, the RTC alleged that the 
defendants failed to discharge their duties and obligations 
properly as directors and officers of City Federal in connection 
with their consideration, approval and subsequent oversight of 
several large acquisition, development and construction loans 
made to various borrowers during 1985 through 1989.  The RTC's 
complaint alleges breach of fiduciary duty, negligence under 
federal common law, and gross negligence under both federal 
common law and § 1821(k) in the approval of these loans, which 
allegedly resulted in damages to City Federal of approximately 
$100 million.  In particular, the RTC alleges that the defendants 
violated their duty of care by: (1) failing to obtain and verify 
necessary financial information from borrowers; (2) maintaining 
inadequate appraisal procedures; (3) consistently loaning funds 
based on excessively high loan-to-value ratios that violated 
mandatory limits placed on such ratios; (4) making repeated 
imprudent long-range commitments to future lending or funding; 
(5) failing to monitor loan disbursements and the ongoing status 
of projects and loans; (6) improperly waiving risk limitations 
and other conditions contained in loan commitments to certain 
borrowers; (7) failing to require and verify that necessary 
                                                                  
will allow the district court better to predict the scope of 
protection that the New Jersey Supreme Court would accord the 
defendants under the business judgment rule by providing the 
court with the opportunity to evaluate the defendants' conduct 
vis-à-vis New Jersey case law. 
  
permits and approvals were obtained before funding the loans; (8) 
improperly assessing the value of guarantees given as security 
for the loans; and (9) not requiring adherence to the Bank’s 
lending policies and procedures.  In this action, the RTC does 
not allege any self-dealing, conflict of interest, bad-faith or 
fraud on the part of the defendants.  
 The City Federal defendants responded to the RTC's 
complaint by moving to dismiss all claims, other than gross 
negligence, arguing that § 1821(k) established an exclusive 
federal gross negligence standard of care for directors and 
officers of failed federally chartered financial institutions 
which supplanted any simple negligence claims available under 
federal common law.  The district court agreed with the 
defendants' argument and accordingly granted their motion to 
dismiss the RTC's complaint to the extent that it alleged claims 
other than gross negligence.  The district court granted the 
RTC’s request to certify the court’s order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b), and we granted the petition for leave to appeal. 
 
 II. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, REFORM, RECOVERY,  
 AND ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1989    
  
                        
 All parties agree that in enacting § 1821(k) Congress 
intended to preempt state laws which limit the liability of 
directors and officers to instances of conduct more culpable than 
  
gross negligence (i.e. intentional misconduct).  At issue in 
these appeals is whether Congress, by its enactment of § 1821(k), 
also preempted state law or displaced federal common law actions 
that impose liability for conduct less culpable than gross 
negligence (e.g. ordinary negligence).  As we have stated, the 
question of the interpretation of § 1821(k) is one of first 
impression in this circuit.  Our review of the construction of 
federal statutes is plenary.  See Doherty v. Teamsters Pension 
Trust Fund, 16 F.3d 1386, 1389 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
 A.  The Plain Meaning of the Statute 
 "The starting point for interpretation of a statute is 
the language of the statute itself.  Absent a clearly expressed 
legislative intention to the contrary, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."  Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1575 
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 The disposition of these appeals turns on the breadth 
of § 1821(k)'s last sentence, which has become known as the 
"savings clause."  Congress provided that "[n]othing in this 
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation 
under other applicable law."  12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (emphases 
supplied).  The RTC contends that this sentence manifests 
congressional intent to preserve the RTC's ability to seek 
recovery from directors and officers under all "other applicable 
  
laws," including the less forgiving negligence and fiduciary duty 
standards of care under state law and federal common law.  We 
agree.7   
 The defendants contend that, when Congress referred to 
"other applicable law" in § 1821(k), it intended to refer only to 
the RTC’s ability to pursue regulatory actions under other 
sections of FIRREA, such as the RTC’s rights under 12 U.S.C.A. 
                     
    
7
  We note that, in addition to focusing on the statute’s 
saving clause, courts concluding that § 1821(k) did not preempt 
state laws which held directors and officers liable for conduct 
less culpable than gross negligence, have also gleaned the 
limited preemptive intent of Congress from its use of the word 
"may" as opposed to "may only" in the first sentence of the 
provision: "[a] director or officer . . . may be held personally 
liable for monetary damages . . . for gross negligence."  In 
Canfield, for example, the court read "may" as a "permissive 
term" that "does not imply a limitation on the standards of 
officer and director liability," refusing "to construe the first 
sentence of the section as saying that an officer or director may 
only be held personally liable for gross negligence."  Canfield, 
967 F.2d at 446 (citing Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 626-27, 107 
S. Ct. 2029, 2034 (1987), where the Court refused to read "may" 
as establishing anything but discretionary power).  The Ninth 
Circuit in McSweeney agreed.  McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 537 ("Had 
Congress intended this authorizing provision to limit the FDIC . 
. . it would have inserted the word `only' in the sentence.").  
But see Bates, 42 F.3d at 371 (rejecting this reading as placing 
"undue emphasis on the word `may,' which does not modify the 
substance of the provision"); Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1361 (same); 
Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 420 (same). 
  We decline to rest our reading of the text of § 1821(k) 
primarily on the belief that Congress intended to demonstrate its 
limited preemptive intent through the use of the word "may" in 
the statute's first sentence.  We do acknowledge, however, that 
such a construction is consistent with what we believe to be 
otherwise obvious from the statute's language and legislative 
history -- Congress intended to permit the RTC to continue to 
seek recovery under laws that hold directors and officers to a 
more stringent standard of care. 
  
§ 1818(b)-(g) (West Supp. 1995) to seek removal of negligent 
directors and officers and to issue "cease and desist" orders in 
cases of simple negligence.  But Congress could not have intended 
to restrict the RTC to such a limited and specific set of legal 
claims by a general reference in this provision to "other 
applicable law."  When Congress limited its reference to the law 
of a particular jurisdiction in other sections of FIRREA, it did 
so with specific language.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1821(c)(3)(B) (1993) ("powers imposed by State law" (emphasis 
added)); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(4) (1993) ("notwithstanding any 
other provision of Federal law, the law of any State, or the 
constitution of any State" (emphasis added)).  In particular, 
when Congress limited its reference to other portions of FIRREA 
itself, it also did so specifically.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1821(e)(3)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1995) ("except as otherwise 
specifically provided in this section" (emphasis added)).  Given 
the specific nature of these references in other portions of 
FIRREA, we think that § 1821(k)’s reference to other applicable 
law plainly demonstrates an intent to refer to all other 
applicable law. 
 Such a reading of the statutory language is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson v. Shumate, 504 
U.S. 753, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992), where the Court read a 
reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in 11 U.S.C.A. 
§ 541(c)(2) to encompass "any relevant nonbankruptcy law, 
  
including federal law such as ERISA."  See also Reich v. Webb, 
336 F.2d 153, 158 (9th Cir. 1964) (reading the language "any 
other law" of 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1) as authorizing federal 
regulators to enforce "common law fiduciary responsibilities 
. . . through appropriate court action"), cert. denied 380 U.S. 
915 (1965).   
 Moreover, reading the savings clause to provide for a 
broad retention of existing rights is supported by its placement 
at the conclusion of the statutory provision.  In Abbott Lab. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 145, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1513-14 (1967), the 
Court affirmed that "it is difficult to think of a more 
appropriate place to put a general saving clause than where 
Congress placed it -- at the conclusion of the section setting 
out a special procedure for use in certain specified instances."  
Id. (emphases added).   
 
 B.  The Legislative History  
 
 Our reading of § 1821(k)'s language is supported by 
clear legislative history, which, in our view, manifests an 
effort to place a floor, not a ceiling, on the liability of 
directors and officers.  See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1126 (Posner, 
C.J., dissenting) ("The purpose of section 1821(k), as the timing 
of the statute's enactment and other features of its history make 
clear, was to place a floor under the liability of directors of 
savings and loan associations, which were falling like 
ninepins.").  We necessarily begin our examination of § 1821(k)’s 
  
legislative history with an inspection of "the provisions of the 
whole law, and . . . its object and policy."  Dole v. United 
Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35, 110 S. Ct. 929, 934 (1990).   
 Section 1821(k) was enacted as part of FIRREA, a 
massive 371-page legislative package that had among its primary 
purposes, as evident in the opening provision of the statute, 
"strengthen[ing] the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of 
depository institutions" and "strengthen[ing] the civil sanctions 
and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging the 
depository institutions and their depositors."  Pub. L. No. 101-
73, § 101(9)-(10), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (emphasis added) 
(reprinted in 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 note (West Supp. II 1990)).  An 
overriding purpose in enacting this legislation was to facilitate 
an effort to "seek out and punish those that have committed 
wrongdoing in the management of the failed institutions,"8 not to 
protect such directors and officers from claims of ordinary 
negligence. 
 Section 1821(k), in particular, was, as we have already 
noted, a reaction to the enactment by various states, during the 
middle and late 1980s, of lenient director liability statutes 
which protected directors from gross negligence claims by 
limiting their liability to instances of reckless, willful and 
                     
    
8
  President’s News Conference on Savings Crisis and 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1989, at D8, col. 1 (statement of 
President Bush). 
  
wanton boardroom misconduct.9  States enacted these laws out of a 
policy concern that too stringent a standard of care would impede 
the ability of a corporation to attract and retain the most 
qualified individuals as corporate directors.  This "race to the 
bottom"10 among certain states was a reaction to the Delaware 
Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 
(Del. 1985), which held the directors of Trans Union Corporation 
liable for their ostensible gross negligence in approving a cash-
out merger notwithstanding the absence of any allegations of 
fraud, bad-faith or self-dealing.  The various states enacting 
these statutes rejected the result in Van Gorkom and sought to 
ensure that their domestic corporations could attract and retain 
                     
    
9
  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2) (Burns 1994) 
(declaring that directors are not liable unless their conduct 
constitutes at least "willful misconduct or recklessness"); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 607.0831 (West 1994) ("recklessness or an act or 
omission which was committed in bad faith or with malicious 
purpose"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson 1994) 
("deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or 
undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interest of the 
corporation"); see also 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 102(b)(7) (West 1994) 
(permitting a company's stockholders to adopt provisions that 
would limit a director's liability to actions that are illegal, 
that constitute a breach of the separate duty of loyalty or that 
constitute intentional transgressions); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-
054(A)(9) (West 1994) (same); CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 
1995) (same). 
    
10
  William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:  
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (describing 
the process whereby states follow each other in enacting changes 
in their corporate law that provide greater protection to 
officers and directors as a "race to the bottom") 
  
qualified directors and officers by protecting them from claims 
of gross negligence.11   
 At the same time that states were extending protection 
from liability to corporate directors, the regulators of 
federally insured depository institutions were embarking on a 
concerted litigation campaign to recoup from allegedly corrupt 
and incompetent directors a portion of the billions of federal 
dollars lost in the bankruptcy of federally insured thrifts.  The 
enactment of § 1821(k) represents an attempt to facilitate this 
litigation in the wake of the impediments posed by state statutes 
insulating directors and officers from liability for gross 
negligence.  The debates over § 1821(k) in the Senate demonstrate 
this intent to facilitate the recovery effort.12 
 The original Senate provision, § 214(n) of the Act, 
would have allowed the RTC to sue directors and officers under 
                     
    
11
  See generally Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment 
Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437 (1985); Harvey 
Gelb, Director Due Care Liability:  An Assessment of the New 
Statutes, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 13 (1988). 
    
12
  Section 1821(k) originated in the Senate; and, other than 
a technical change in the wording of the savings clause, no 
substantive debate or amendments to this provision occurred in 
the House or at Conference.  The House replaced the Senate 
version of the Savings clause, which had referred to "any right, 
if any, of the [RTC] that may have existed immediately prior to 
the enactment of the FIRREA act," with the current version.  The 
defendants in these actions, however, correctly do not attribute 
any substantive change in Congressional intent to the adoption of 
this amendment.  See McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 541 n.9 ("We see 
nothing in this change to indicate an intent to expand the 
preemptive effect of this provision."). 
  
"any cause of action available at common law, including, but not 
limited to, negligence . . . [and] breach of fiduciary duty."  S. 
774, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 214(n) (1989).  During the Senate 
debate, this proposal was modified so as to scale back the extent 
of state law preemption by raising the floor on the liability of 
directors from "negligence" to "gross negligence."    
 The amendment resulted, in large part, from a concern 
expressed by Senator Sanford that the sweep of the original 
provision was too broad given the valid policy interest, 
expressed by states enacting legislation in response to the Van 
Gorkom decision, of attracting the best qualified individuals as 
directors.  135 CONG. REC. 7150-51 (Apr. 19, 1989).  Senator 
Sanford expressed the case for the amendment as follows: 
 The bill as drafted would have preempted 
numerous state laws which provided limited 
indemnification for directors and officers.  
These state laws were enacted largely in 
response to problems faced by corporations in 
attracting good officers and directors. . . . 
The amendment which the managers have 
accepted modifies the bill to preempt state 
law only in a very limited capacity. . . . 
[Section 1821(k)] is not a wholesale 
preemption of longstanding principles of 
corporate governance, nor does it represent a 
major step in the direction of establishing 
Federal tort standards or Federal standards 
of care of corporate officers and directors. 
 
Id.  Senator Riegle, the bill's floor manager, evinced agreement 
with these concerns, see id. at S4265, and introduced an 
amendment reducing the amount of preemption.   
  
 During its introduction, Senator Riegle again explained 
the purpose of the amendment: 
 In recent years, many States have enacted 
legislation that protects directors or 
officers of companies from damage suits. 
These "insulating" statutes provide for 
various amounts of immunity to directors and 
officers. For example, in Indiana, a director 
or officer is liable for damages only if his 
conduct constitutes "willful misconduct or 
recklessness."   
 
  The reported bill totally preempted 
state law in this area, with respect to suits 
brought by the FDIC against bank directors 
and officers.  However, in light of the state 
law implications raised by this provision, 
the manager's amendment scales back the scope 
of this preemption.   
 
  Under the managers' amendment, State law 
would be overruled only to the extent that it 
forbids the FDIC to bring suit based on 
"gross negligence" or an "intentional tort." 
 
Id. at 7152-53 (Apr. 19, 1989) (emphases added).  Senators Roth 
and Garn also expressed similar sentiments: the intent of this 
amendment was to limit, not expand, the preemptive scope of the 
provision.  See id. at 7155.   
 The defendants, however, like the Seventh Circuit in 
Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 422-23, interpret the concerns motivating 
this amendment to demonstrate Congressional intent to adopt a 
national standard of gross negligence for actions brought by the 
RTC in the service of a federal policy of attracting qualified 
officers and directors to federally insured financial 
  
institutions.13  We reject this "revisionism," since, as we have 
demonstrated, the evolution of § 1821(k) in the Senate does not 
represent the adoption of a national standard of gross negligence 
over one of ordinary negligence, but rather reflects an effort to 
decrease the amount of state law preemption by raising the floor 
on the liability of directors and officers. 
 The limited sweep of § 1821(k) is also explicitly 
demonstrated in a final section-by-section report prepared by the 
Senate Banking Committee.  This report is consistent with other 
contemporaneous legislative history, and it makes clear that 
§ 1821(k) did not disturb any claims, available as a matter of 
state or federal law, that would hold directors and officers 
liable for conduct less culpable than gross negligence:   
 This subsection does not prevent the FDIC 
from pursuing claims under State law or other 
applicable Federal law, if such law permits 
the officers or directors of a financial 
institution to be sued (1) for violating a 
lower standard of care, such as simple 
negligence. 
 
                     
    
13
  To support their position the defendants also incorrectly 
point to a statement made by Senator Heflin:  "I think the 
language should be reviewed and, in my judgment, changed to 
ensure that financial institutions are able to attract strong and 
capable individuals as directors and officers."  135 CONG. REC. at 
7137.  As recognized by the Tenth Circuit in Canfield, 967 F.2d 
at 790, Senator Heflin’s comments do not relate to § 1821(k), but 
rather involved a proposed change to 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818(i)(2) 
(Supp. 1995), which made it more difficult for the RTC to obtain 
civil penalties against directors and officers.  See 135 CONG. 
REC. at 7138 ("I am merely recommending that due process and 
fairness dictate that clear standards should be included in 
assessment of civil penalties." (statement of Senator Heflin)). 
  
135 CONG. REC. S6912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989) (emphases 
supplied).   
 The defendants would have us discount this report as 
post-enactment legislative history, even though it was available 
six weeks before both the Senate and the House enacted the final 
version of FIRREA into law.  The defendants base their argument 
on the fact that the Senate Banking Committee did not publish 
this report until two months after the Senate passed an initial 
version of FIRREA, since the period of time between introduction 
and passage of the Senate’s initial bill was so short.  In 
support of this position, the defendants rely on Clarke v. 
Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 407, 107 S. Ct. 750, 761 
(1987), where the Court refused to "attach substantial weight" to 
a statement placed in the congressional record by a sponsor of an 
act ten days after the law was passed.  See Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 
421-22.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in Clarke is 
distinguishable, however, given that the legislative history in 
Clarke involved a statement "placed in the Congressional Record 
10 days after the passage of the . . . Act."  Clarke, 479 U.S. at 
407, 107 S. Ct. at 761.  In discounting the value of the 
statement at issue, the Court recognized that "Congress did not 
have [the statement] before it in passing the . . . Act."  Id.  
In contrast, Congress (both Houses), in enacting § 1821(k), did 
have this report "before it" in passing the final version of 
FIRREA.  Moreover, the legislative history in Clarke did not 
  
involve a report prepared by the congressional committee that 
originally considered the provision in question but rather 
involved a statement by a single congressman whom the Court 
considered not to be an "impartial interpreter of the bill."  Id. 
 To support their reading of § 1821(k)’s legislative 
history, the defendants rely on a portion of FIRREA's Conference 
Report, which provides: 
 Title II preempts State law with respect to 
claims brought by the FDIC in any capacity 
against officers and directors of an insured 
depository institution.  The preemption 
allows the FDIC to pursue claims for gross 
negligence or any conduct that demonstrates a 
greater disregard of a duty of care, 
including intentional tortious conduct.   
 
H.R. REP. NO. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1989 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 437 (emphases supplied).  We do not believe 
that the Conference Report supports the defendants' position.  
While the report does acknowledge that § 1821(k) preempts State 
law, such an acknowledgement is entirely consistent with the 
statute's limited preemptive intent.  Moreover, the second 
sentence of this portion of the Conference Report acknowledges 
that which is evident throughout the legislative history:  
§ 1821(k) "allows" the RTC to pursue claims for gross negligence 
in states not permitting such claims, but does not "limit" it 
from pursuing claims for ordinary negligence, when available 
under applicable law.  See Canfield, 967 F.2d at 448 n.6; 
McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 539.  
  
 We are also unpersuaded by the defendants' reliance on 
congressional attempts to preserve more explicitly the RTC's 
right to bring a claim for negligence under other applicable 
state or federal law by seeking to amend § 1821(k) in years 
following its enactment.14  It is settled law that post-enactment 
legislative history should be afforded little or no weight, 
especially in the face of contradictory contemporaneous 
legislative history.  See U.S. v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, ___ n.4, 
113 S. Ct. 1631, 1635 n.4 (1993) ("[S]ubsequent legislative 
history is a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier Congress." (internal quotation marks omitted)); U.S. v. 
Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 749 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[P]ost-enactment 
legislative history . . . should be given little, if any, weight 
because [it] do[es] not necessarily reflect the intent of the 
members of Congress who originally enacted the statutory 
language."), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 897 (1995).  As this court 
has stated, adopting the language of Justice Scalia, 
                     
    
14
  For example, Congressman Richard Baker of Louisiana 
proposed an amendment in October 1991, which provided: 
 
 Paragraph (1) shall not be construed as impairing 
or affecting any right of the . . . [RTC] 
under any provision of applicable State or 
other federal law, including any provision of 
common law or any law establishing the 
personal liability of any director or officer 
of any insured depository institution under 
any standard pursuant to such law. 
 
H.R. 3435, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 228 (Comm. Markup Oct. 18, 
1991). 
  
 "Subsequent legislative history" -- which 
presumably means the post-enactment history 
of a statute’s consideration and enactment -- 
is a contradiction in terms. . . .  Arguments 
based on subsequent legislative history, like 
arguments based on antecedent futurity, 
should not be taken seriously, not even in a 
footnote. 
 
Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32, 110 
S. Ct. 2658, 2667 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)).   
 In particular, courts should be hesitant to examine 
congressional attempts to amend ambiguous legislative provisions 
in an effort to determine the intent of a previous Congress in 
originally enacting the law.  The fact that Congress subsequently 
sought to clarify the limited preemptive intent of § 1821(k) in 
the face of conflicting judicial interpretations15 is not 
surprising.  Courts finding "retrospective" legislative intent in 
such proposed enactments could improperly draw inferences from 
unsuccessful Congressional attempts to clarify ambiguities which 
Congress did not perceive at the time of enactment.  Such 
attempts simply do not shed light on the intent of the Congress 
that originally enacted the provision. 
                     
    
15
  The dispute in the Courts of Appeals about the intended 
preemptive effect of § 1821(k) was preceded by similar 
disagreement among district courts considering these issues at 
the time Congress proposed the clarifying amendment.  Compare 
FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533 (D. Utah 1991) (concluding 
that § 1821(k) preempts state law), rev’d, 967 F.2d 443 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (en banc); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. 
Ill. 1991) (concluding that § 1821(k) displaces federal common 
law) with FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 828 (D. Colo. 1991) 
(concluding that § 1821(k) does not preempt state law), and FDIC 
v. Haddad, 778 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (same). 
  
 In sum, we conclude that the legislative history 
associated with FIRREA, and particularly § 1821(k), does not 
manifest Congressional intent to adopt a uniform gross negligence 
standard of care for directors and officers of bankrupt federally 
insured depository institutions.  Rather, the legislative history 
reflects an effort to ensure that directors and officers of 
state-chartered institutions (whom Congress viewed as responsible 
for a portion of the significant amount of federal money lost in 
the insolvency of such institutions) not escape liability to the 
RTC under the shield of certain state laws that had effectively 
insulated them even from claims based on their grossly negligent 
or reckless conduct.  The intent of Congress was to strengthen, 
not weaken, the RTC’s hand in pursuit of directors and officers.  
Mindful of this intent, and of our reading of the statute’s 
language, we now directly address, in turn, the particular 
questions whether Congress preempted state law, or supplanted 
federal common law claims brought by the RTC for negligence and 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
 III.  State Law Preemption  
 Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, 
cl. 2, "state laws that ‘interfere with, or are contrary to the 
laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution’ are 
invalid."  Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 
604, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2481 (1991) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 
  
Wheat 1, 211 (1824)).  Federal law preempts existing state law in 
either of two ways:  (1) through evidence of congressional intent 
to supplant state authority in a particular area, as expressed 
either through the language of the statute, see Jones v. Rath 
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S. Ct. 1305, 1309-10 (1977), 
or implicitly through the enactment of a federal regulatory 
scheme "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it," Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 
(1947); or (2) when federal law and state law actually conflict, 
such as when "compliance with both federal and state regulations 
is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217 (1963), 
or when a state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 (1941).   
 As we have stated, both a plain reading of § 1821(k) 
and an interpretation of its legislative history reflect a 
congressional effort to expand, not constrain, the RTC’s ability 
to recover against directors and officers by enabling it to seek 
recovery in those states that had adopted laws insulating 
officers and directors from liability.  Given this interpretation 
of the statute and its legislative history, we conclude that 
Congress intended to leave room for state law to supplement 
§ 1821(k) by permitting recovery in instances of ordinary 
  
negligence.  Moreover, we do not believe that state laws 
subjecting directors of federally insured depository institutions 
to a more stringent standard of care by permitting recovery in 
instances of negligence conflict in any way with the 
congressional enactment of § 1821(k).  In fact, such state laws 
are consistent with the expressed congressional purpose in 
enacting FIRREA of "strengthen[ing] the enforcement powers of 
Federal regulators of depository institutions" and 
"strengthen[ing] the civil sanctions . . . for . . . damaging the 
depository institutions and their depositors."  Pub. L. No. 101-
73, § 101(9)-(10), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (emphases added) 
(reprinted in 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 note (West Supp. II 1990)). 
 The two Courts of Appeals that have directly confronted 
this question also have reached this conclusion.  In Canfield, 
967 F.2d at 443, the Tenth Circuit sitting en banc concluded that 
§ 1821(k) did not preempt available state law claims that permit 
the RTC to recover in instances of conduct less culpable than 
gross negligence, and the Ninth Circuit in McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 
532, relying on Canfield, reached an identical result.  In 
addition to interpreting § 1821(k)'s language and legislative 
history in a manner similar to that expressed supra, these courts 
set forth several additional reasons in support of their 
conclusion, which we also find persuasive.   
 First, they rejected the contention that Congress was 
motivated in enacting § 1821(k) by a need for a national 
  
liability standard in view of the fact that the statute clearly 
calls for the application of various applicable state law 
definitions of gross negligence.  12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) ("as such 
terms are defined and determined under applicable State law"); 
McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 539; Canfield, 967 F.2d at 447.  The 
Canfield court noted that, given the vast differences in the 
standards of gross negligence in the various states, id. 
("`[T]here is . . . no generally accepted meaning [of gross 
negligence]'" (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 34 at 212 (5th ed. 1984)), "the statute cannot 
possibly, even without the last sentence, create a national 
standard of liability."  Canfield, 967 F.2d at 447.  We agree 
that the congressional use of state law formulations of gross 
negligence further illustrates the limited preemptive intent of 
Congress in enacting § 1821(k).  If Congress had been motivated 
by a need for uniformity in the law it would not have invoked the 
application of alternative state definitions of gross negligence, 
but rather would have called for the application of a uniform 
federal standard. 
 In addition, the Canfield and McSweeney courts also 
based their result on a persuasive policy concern: 
 [U]nder defendants' interpretation, consider 
the position of an officer or director of a 
troubled federally insured institution in a 
state allowing actions for negligence.  Prior 
to failure, liability would attach for simple 
negligence.  After failure, liability would 
only attach if the officer or director could 
be proven grossly negligent under the 
applicable state definition.  As the 
  
institution struggles, therefore, section 
1821(k) would create an incentive for the 
officers and directors to allow the bank to 
fail.  It simply cannot be that FIRREA would 
indirectly encourage such behavior when it 
was designed in part, according to its stated 
purposes, "to curtail . . . activities of 
savings associations that pose unacceptable 
risks to the Federal deposit insurance 
funds." FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101(3), 
103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989).  
 
Canfield, 967 F.2d at 449; see also McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 540-
41.   
 In response to this argument, the defendants correctly 
point out that if a director or officer purposely engages in 
conduct leading an institution into receivership, such actions 
would themselves constitute intentional conduct and indisputably 
result in liability under § 1821(k).  See also Canfield, 967 F.2d 
at 450 n.5 (Brorby, J., dissenting).  On balance, however, we 
find this rejoinder to the RTC's policy argument unpersuasive.  
Directors and officers of financial institutions are well advised 
of their potential liability under the law.  (Indeed, the 
argument that too stringent a standard of care will discourage 
capable people from becoming or remaining as directors itself 
presumes a sophisticated level of knowledge on the part of such 
individuals.)  For instance, they would undoubtedly be aware that 
federal receivership would insulate them from claims of 
negligence.  Armed with this knowledge, directors and officers of 
institutions chartered in states permitting such claims would 
have more of an incentive to engage in conduct, which the RTC 
  
could not necessarily prove rises to the level of intentional 
conduct or gross negligence, but which nonetheless placed the 
institution at greater risk of receivership.   
 In sum, we conclude that Congress did not intend to 
hinder the RTC by denying it an opportunity to recover for 
instances of director and officer negligence when shareholders of 
these institutions would have had a right under state law before 
receivership, to bring such an action on behalf of the 
corporation.  Accordingly, we conclude § 1821(k) does not preempt 
the RTC’s right to pursue a claim for conduct less culpable than 
gross negligence, if any are available under New Jersey law, 
against the United Savings defendants. 
 
 IV.   Displacement of Federal Common Law 
 We next address whether, by its enactment of § 1821(k), 
Congress foreclosed the RTC’s ability to bring a claim against 
officers or directors of federally chartered depository 
institutions under federal common law for conduct less culpable 
than gross negligence.  The answer to the question of federal 
common law displacement turns on an interpretation of 
congressional intent.  While it is unnecessary to find that 
Congress "had affirmatively proscribed the use of federal common 
law," in order to conclude that federal common law has been 
supplanted, Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315, 101 S. Ct. 
1784, 1791 (1981) (internal quotation mark omitted), "any terms 
  
of the statute explicitly preserving or preempting judge-made law 
are of course controlling, as is clear evidence of Congressional 
intent to achieve such results."  In re Complaint of Oswego Barge 
Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 339 (2d Cir. 1981) ("In the absence of 
clearly expressed legislative intent, legislative history may 
provide useful guidance."). 
 Lacking statutory language or clear evidence of 
congressional intent, we must glean the intent of Congress by 
examining whether "the legislative scheme spoke directly" to the 
question previously addressed by federal common law, Milwaukee v. 
Illinois, 451 U.S. at 315, 101 S. Ct. at 1791 (internal quotation 
mark omitted), and assessing the "scope of the legislation."  Id. 
at 314-15 n.8, 101 S. Ct. at 1791-92 n.8 (examining whether "‘the 
field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or 
authorized administrative standards.’" (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 
441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971)).  In whole, our inquiry must 
discern the intent of Congress so as to resolve the question 
whether applying federal common law would constitute "filling a 
gap left by Congress’ silence," which is proper, or involve 
"rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically 
enacted," which is improper.  Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 
436 U.S. 618, 625, 98 S. Ct. 2010, 2015 (1978). 
 We must begin our inquiry, as we have stated, by 
determining whether "any terms of the statute explicitly 
preserv[e] or preempt[] judge-made law."  Oswego Barge, 664 F.2d 
  
at 339.  In drafting § 1821(k), Congress provided such language, 
stating "[n]othing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any 
right of the Corporation under other applicable law."  12 
U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (emphases supplied).  We read the plain 
meaning of this savings clause as preserving the RTC’s right to 
proceed against directors and officers of federally-chartered 
institutions under federal common law.  The defendants concede 
that before receivership City Federal ("the Corporation") had a 
right to bring an action against them under federal common law.  
Furthermore, they concede that upon receivership the RTC 
"obtain[ed] the rights of [City Federal,] the insured depository 
institution that existed prior to receivership."  O’Melveny & 
Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2054.  Accordingly, we conclude the plain 
meaning of this provision -- which, stated again, preserves "any 
right of the Corporation under other applicable law" -- secures 
the RTC’s ability to proceed against the defendants pursuant to 
City Federal’s pre-existing rights under federal common law.  In 
so doing, we reject the City Federal defendants’ reading of this 
provision’s reference to "other applicable law" as one intended 
to invoke only the RTC’s rights under other sections of FIRREA or 
State law.  As we have demonstrated, when Congress intended to 
limit its reference to the law of a particular jurisdiction or to 
other portions of FIRREA itself, it did so with the use of 
specific language.  See supra pages 14-15.    
  
 Notwithstanding the plain meaning of § 1821(k)’s 
savings clause, the defendants contend that we must declare any 
available federal common law claims supplanted if Congress "spoke 
directly" to the question of the liability of directors and 
officers of insolvent depository institutions or "‘occupied the 
field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory 
program supervised by an expert administrative agency,’" 
Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 424 (quoting Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317, 
101 S. Ct. at 1792).  We think that is not enough since, as we 
have stated, the answer to the question of federal common law 
displacement, like state law preemption, must turn, in the first 
instance, on an interpretation of congressional intent, looking 
to the text of the statute and then to its legislative history. 
 In support of their position, the defendants rely on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, 
which concluded that the enactment of the 1972 Amendments to the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act supplanted the federal common 
law claim for abatement of a nuisance caused by interstate water 
pollution.  The Court did so after examining the scope of the 
legislation and whether it spoke directly to the question 
previously addressed by federal common law.  We do not believe 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Milwaukee is inconsistent with our 
approach.   
 The Court in Milwaukee did not reach its conclusion 
that federal common law was supplanted until after first 
  
examining in detail the question whether "congressional intent to 
preserve the federal common-law remedy . . . is evident in . . . 
the statute."  See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 327-31, 101 S. Ct. at 
1797-1800.  The Court concluded that no such congressional intent 
was present.  Id.  In contrast, the intent of Congress 
surrounding the adoption of § 1821(k), as evident by both the 
provision’s plain meaning and its legislative history, explicitly 
preserves any federal remedy for conduct violating a lower 
standard of care, such as simple negligence.  The relevant Senate 
Report clearly states that "this subsection does not prevent the 
FDIC from pursuing claims under . . . other Federal law, if such 
law permits the officers or directors of a financial institution 
to be sued (1) for violating a lower standard of care, such as 
simple negligence."  135 CONG. REC. S6912 (daily ed. June 19, 
1989).   
 Moreover, we do not believe (1) that § 1821(k) "spoke 
directly" to the standard of care applicable to directors and 
officers of federally-chartered depository institutions or (2) 
that the scope of this legislation occupied the field.  The 
defendants contend that in enacting § 1821(k) Congress "spoke 
directly" to the standard of care for directors and officers of 
federally chartered institutions previously governed by federal 
common law.  We disagree.  As we have demonstrated, in enacting 
§ 1821(k) Congress sought to address the question of what 
standard should apply in cases where the RTC was confronted with 
  
an applicable state insulating statute, so as to ensure that the 
RTC could recover when the applicable state law insulated 
directors and officers from actions for gross negligence.  While 
portions of FIRREA were enacted to govern both state and 
federally chartered institutions, see 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(a)-(c) 
(1989), § 1821(k) was simply not enacted to define the standard 
of care applicable to federally chartered institutions governed 
by federal common law.    
 Section 1821(k) calls for the application of the 
"applicable State law" formulation of gross negligence.  To read 
this sub-section as supplanting federal common law would be to 
create an additional (and serious) problem, because it is unclear 
which formulation of gross negligence the City Federal defendants 
would have us apply.  See KEETON, supra, at 212 (there is "no 
generally accepted meaning" of gross negligence).  In a case 
involving the liability of directors and officers of a federally 
chartered institution, such as City Federal, no state law 
standard is "applicable," since federal law governs the liability 
of such individuals.  See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122.  If Congress 
had intended to speak directly to the question of what standard 
should apply when the depository institution is federally 
chartered, it would, in our view, have addressed the question of 
which formulation of gross negligence should apply in such 
instances.  The absence of such direction and the provision’s 
reference to "applicable State law" reinforces our conclusion 
  
that Congress did not intend to address the liability standards 
applicable to directors and officers of federally chartered 
institutions in enacting § 1821(k), but rather enacted the 
provision for the purpose of preempting state insulating 
statutes. 
 In addition, we find it inconceivable that Congress 
intended to displace existing federal common law which already 
provided an action for conduct less culpable than gross 
negligence only in instances when an institution enters 
receivership.  If Congress had intended to codify a federal 
standard of liability for directors and officers of federally 
chartered institutions, it would not have limited its application 
to circumstances where the institution entered receivership.  
Such an approach would, if the federal common law standard is one 
of ordinary negligence, create the anomalous situation of 
providing greater protection from liability to directors and 
officers when their institutions go insolvent, since before 
receivership directors and officers would be subject to 
derivative claims for ordinary negligence by the "Corporation," 
while after receivership such claims would be limited to gross 
negligence.   
 This scenario would create a perverse incentive for the 
directors and officers who manage our nation’s federally 
chartered institutions to decrease their risk of liability by 
leading their institutions into receivership.  See supra at 29-
  
31.  Congress could not have intended to create such an incentive 
in enacting a statute intended to "strengthen the enforcement 
powers of Federal regulators."  Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101(10), 
103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989).  Even assuming that the proper 
characterization of preexisting federal common law standard (as 
one of negligence or gross negligence) is unclear, it seems quite 
unlikely that Congress would have intended to reformulate the 
post-receivership standard as gross-negligence, while leaving the 
pre-receivership standard in a state of ambiguity.16   
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  Given our conclusion that § 1821(k) does not address the 
liability of directors and officers of federally chartered 
institutions, we need not discern whether the federal common law 
standard is one of ordinary or gross negligence.  The district 
court should simply permit the RTC to proceed against the City 
Federal defendants under existing federal common law.  We note 
that the Supreme Court first articulated a common law standard of 
care for directors and officers of federally chartered depository 
institutions over 100 years ago in Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 
132, 11 S. Ct. 924 (1891):  
  
 The degree of care required depends upon the 
subject to which it is to be applied, and 
each case has to be determined in view of all 
the circumstances. . . . [T]he duties imposed 
are presumed to call for nothing more than 
ordinary care and attention. . . .  If 
nothing has come to their knowledge, to 
awaken suspicion of the fidelity of the 
president and cashier, ordinary attention to 
the affairs of the institution is sufficient.  
If they become acquainted with any fact 
calculated to put prudent men on their guard, 
a degree of care commensurate with the evil 
to be avoided is required, and a want of that 
care certainly makes them responsible. . . . 
In any view the degree of care to which these 
defendants were bound is that which 
ordinarily prudent and diligent men would 
exercise under similar circumstances . . . .  
  
 We also reject the defendants’ contention that the 
federal common law was supplanted because of the scope of FIRREA.  
Relying on the opinion in Milwaukee, the defendants seek to 
capitalize on the fact that FIRREA created several agencies, such 
as the RTC, to deal with the thrift crisis, and conferred upon 
these institutions expanded federal regulatory powers over the 
activities of the officers and directors of insured financial 
institutions.  However, Milwaukee does not help the defendants’ 
position.  In examining the scope of the legislation there in 
question, the Milwaukee Court relied in significant part on a 
number of statements in the Act’s legislative history which 
demonstrated "the establishment of . . . a self-consciously 
                                                                  
 
Id. at 148, 11 S. Ct. at 929.   
 We recognize that Briggs arose before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938), and hence, while addressing the liability of 
directors and officers of a nationally chartered bank, it did not 
label the articulated standard as one of federal common law.  
Moreover, in light of the dramatic changes to have occurred to 
the legal and economic environment confronted by federally-
chartered depository institutions, the Supreme Court might choose 
to reexamine and/or refine the Briggs articulation of the common 
law standard of liability for directors and officers of such 
institutions.  
 Nevertheless, over a century later, the Briggs articulation 
of the standard of care apparently continues to apply as a matter 
of federal common law.  For instance, in FDIC v. Appling, 992 
F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit described 
the standard of care for directors and officers of a federally 
chartered bank "as requiring such care and diligence as an 
ordinarily prudent man would exercise with reference to the 
administration and management of such a moneyed institution."  
See also FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F.3d 1424, 1432 (7th Cir. 1993) 
("Ordinary care, in this matter as in other departments of the 
law, means that degree of care which ordinarily prudent and 
diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances."). 
  
comprehensive program by Congress."  Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 319, 
101 S. Ct. at 1793 ("The ‘major purpose’ of the Amendments was 
‘to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the 
elimination of water pollution.’" (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 
95)).  The defendants in this action can point to nothing in the 
plain language of the statute or its legislative history to 
suggest that Congress, in enacting FIRREA, intended to establish 
a comprehensive legislative program to address the liability of 
directors and officers.  Rather, as we have demonstrated, the 
congressional purpose in enacting FIRREA, and § 1821(k) in 
particular, was exactly the opposite.   
 As Senator Sanford recognized, this provision does not 
represent "a wholesale preemption of longstanding principles of 
corporate governance, nor does it represent a major step in the 
direction of establishing Federal tort standards or Federal 
standards of care of corporate officers and directors."  135 
CONG. REC. at 7151.  Rather than intending exhaustively to 
enumerate the powers available to federal regulators, Congress 
sought only to strengthen the RTC’s ability to recover against 
malfeasant directors and officers of our nation’s thrifts by 
supplementing the laws that already regulated the activity of 
directors and officers, such as the federal common law standard 
of care.  We cannot conclude solely from the enactment of 
provisions meant to enhance the powers of federal regulators that 
Congress intended to occupy the field and supplant existing 
  
powers already available as a matter of federal common law.  
Rather, Congress explicitly preserved "any right" available 
"under other applicable law." 
 In sum, the intent of Congress in enacting § 1821(k) 
was not to insulate directors and officers of bankrupt federally 
insured depository institutions from federal common law liability 
for conduct less culpable than gross negligence.  Rather, 
§ 1821(k) reflects, as we have demonstrated, an effort to ensure 
that directors and officers could not escape liability to the RTC 
under the shield of certain state laws that had effectively 
insulated them from claims based on their grossly negligent or 
reckless conduct.  To read any more into the enactment of 
§ 1821(k) would, as Chief Judge Posner has recognized, "make 
traps of its words" and perniciously turn the statute on its 
head, since Congress intended this provision to strengthen, not 
weaken, the RTC’s ability to recover for director and officer 
misconduct.  See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1126-27 (Posner, C.J., 
dissenting) ("What would otherwise be a more stringent standard, 
that of simple negligence, is diluted by interpretation of a 
statute intended to make the liability of such directors more 
stringent.").   
 We recognize that the two Courts of Appeals to have 
addressed both state law preemption and the displacement of 
federal common law by § 1821(k) would permit the RTC to pursue an 
action for negligence under state law, but not under federal 
  
common law.  See Frates, 52 F.3d at 295 and Canfield, 967 F.2d at 
443 (10th Cir.); Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122 and Gallagher, 10 F.3d 
at 416 (7th Cir.).  These courts have justified such a 
distinction by the need for greater congressional intent to 
preempt state law as opposed to that necessary to displace 
federal common law, given the federalism concerns present when 
state law is preempted.  Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 424 ("‘Such 
concerns are not implicated in the same fashion when the question 
is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and 
accordingly the same sort of evidence of clear and manifest 
purpose is not required.’" (quoting Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316, 
101 S. Ct. at 1792); see also Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317, 101 S. 
Ct. at 1792 ("[T]he assumption [is] that it is for Congress, not 
federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be 
applied as a matter of federal law." (internal quotation mark 
omitted)).   
 We agree that this generalized reasoning can result, in 
certain instances, in a conclusion that a particular statutory 
enactment did not preempt state law, yet did displace federal 
common law.  However, in our view, the distinction is not 
determinative here since the plain meaning of § 1821(k) and the 
clear legislative history surrounding its enactment, which 
demonstrates that this provision was not intended to apply to 
federally chartered institutions, sufficiently overcome the 
presumption favoring the displacement of federal common law. 
  
 In reaching the contrary conclusion that § 1821(k) 
displaced federal common law, the courts of appeals to have 
considered the question have relied, in significant part, on the 
argument that permitting the RTC to seek recovery for a 
director’s negligence would render § 1821(k) meaningless.  The 
Seventh Circuit in Gallagher stated that "[r]eading the ‘savings 
clause’ as preserving a federal common law standard of liability 
for less culpable conduct than gross negligence would render the 
substantive portion of § 1821(k) surplusage."  Gallagher, 10 F.3d 
at 420 ("It is illogical that Congress intended in one sentence 
to establish a gross negligence standard of liability and in the 
next sentence to eviscerate that standard by allowing actions 
under federal common law for simple negligence."); see also 
Bates, 42 F.3d at 372 ("If the court reads the savings clause to 
preserve simple negligence claims, then the gross negligence 
standard explicitly articulated . . . is redundant, meaningless 
surplusage."); Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1361.  Moreover, in 
articulating this "surplusage" argument, the Fifth Circuit in 
Miramon rhetorically inquired -- "Why would the RTC ever bring an 
action under section 1821(k), where it would have to prove gross 
negligence, when it could bring an action under the federal 
common law and only be required to prove simple negligence?"  Id. 
 We are unpersuaded by this argument.  Given the RTC’s 
concession that it can only bring federal common law claims 
against directors and officers of federally chartered 
  
institutions and not against their state-chartered counterparts, 
the answer to the Miramon court’s question is clear.  Concluding 
that § 1821(k) does not displace federal common law does not 
render this provision "redundant, meaningless surplusage" because 
the RTC still needs § 1821(k) to bring actions for gross 
negligence against directors and officers of institutions 
chartered in states with statutes insulating them from such 
liability.  More particularly, the RTC could not bring a federal 
common law claim of negligence against directors and officers of 
depository institutions chartered in states with statutes 
insulating them from liability claims of gross negligence (or 
worse), since, as the RTC concedes, state law governs the 
liability of these individuals in the instances where § 1821(k) 
does not apply.  See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122 (holding that the 
applicable law governing the liability of officers and directors 
for their stewardship of the corporation is the law of the 
jurisdiction where the institution was incorporated or 
chartered).  Accordingly, § 1821(k) is needed to ensure that the 
RTC is not constrained from seeking recovery for gross negligence 
in instances where a state insulating statute would apply.   
 As we have stated, allowing the RTC to bring such 
actions was precisely the purpose underlying the enactment of 
§ 1821(k).  When the defendants are directors of federally 
chartered institutions, such as City Federal, this purpose is not 
present and the statute simply has no relevance.  Permitting the 
  
RTC to pursue an action under federal common law when the 
depository institution is federally chartered in no way renders 
the statute inoperative; rather such a conclusion merely 
appropriately limits § 1821(k) to its intended realm.   
 V. CONCLUSION 
 We hold that Congress did not preempt existing state 
law or supplant federal common law holding directors and officers 
liable for conduct less culpable than gross negligence.17  
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's order in the 
United Savings action, permitting the RTC to pursue negligence 
and fiduciary duty claims, if any, under New Jersey law.  In the 
City Federal action, we will reverse the district court's order 
and direct the court to permit the RTC to pursue any claims for 
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty available as a matter of 
federal common law.  
 
                     
    
17
  As we have noted, in addition to bringing a claim under 
federal common law in the City Federal action, the RTC has also 
brought a claim of gross negligence under § 1821(k).  Given our 
conclusion that Congress did not intend § 1821(k) to apply to 
federally-chartered depository institutions, the RTC cannot 
proceed under § 1821(k) in the City Federal action.  
RTC v. Cityfed Financial Corp, et al., No.  94-5307   
RTC v. Schuster, et al., No. 94-5308 
 
 
 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
 
  
 I concur in the majority's holding that section 1821(k) 
of the Financial Institutions, Reform, Recovery and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k), does not preempt 
claims for simple negligence or breach of fiduciary duty that may 
be available to the RTC under state law.  I respectfully dissent, 
however, from Part IV of the opinion, where the majority holds 
that section 1821(k) does not supplant the RTC's ability to bring 
such actions under federal common law.  I find the majority's 
conclusion contrary to the statute's language and legislative 
history.  I believe that section 1821(k) establishes a gross 
negligence standard of liability in suits brought by the RTC 
against the directors and officers of federally-chartered insured 
depository institutions, and accordingly would hold, as our 
sister courts of appeals in the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth 
Circuits have held18, that the federal common law standard of 
simple negligence19 must yield to section 1821(k)'s higher 
standard in such cases.   
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 RTC v. Frates, ___ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. 1995) [1995 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 7990]; RTC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1994); RTC 
v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357 (5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 
F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993). 
    
19
 The majority does not decide what standard of liability 
controls under the federal common law.  Nevertheless, it strongly 
suggests in footnote 16 that it is one of ordinary (or simple) 
negligence and discusses the question before us as if the federal 
common law would permit the RTC to sue the directors and officers 
of failed federally chartered insured depository institutions for 
simple negligence. 
  
 My analysis is guided throughout by the vastly 
different tests the Supreme Court has instructed us to use when 
deciding whether a federal statute supplants federal common law 
on the one hand, or preempts state law on the other.  When 
considering state law preemption, "`we start with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States are not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress'".  Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 
304, 316 (1981) (citations omitted).  By contrast, when the 
question is whether federal statutory or federal common law 
governs, "`we start with the assumption' that it is for Congress, 
not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be 
applied as a matter of law."  Id. at 317 (footnote omitted).  
Federal common law is a "`necessary expedient'", resorted to in 
the absence of a federal statute and is "`subject to the 
paramount authority of Congress.'"  Id. at 313-14 (citations 
omitted).  Although a statute will not invade well established 
principles of common law unless a statutory purpose to the 
contrary is present, United States v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. 
Ct. 1631, 1634 (1993), when Congress "speak[s] directly" to the 
question addressed by the common law, federal common law is 
supplanted.  Id.; Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 315.  
Moreover, it is not necessary for Congress to "affirmatively 
proscribe" the federal common law rule in order to abrogate its 
application.  Id.   
  
 
 I. 
 All questions of statutory interpretation start with 
the language of the statute itself, and "[a]bsent a clearly 
expressed legislative intent to the contrary, `that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'"  Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990), quoting 
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 
102, 108 (1980).   
          Section 1821(k) has two parts: a substantive provision 
and a savings clause.  In the first sentence, section 1821(k) 
provides that "[a] director or officer of an insured depository 
institution may be held personally liable in any civil action 
by[] . . . the [RTC] . . . for gross negligence, including any 
similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard 
of a duty of care . . . as such terms are defined and determined 
under applicable State law[]"; and in the second sentence, saves 
"any right of the [RTC] under other applicable law".20   Under 
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 Section 1821(k) provides in pertinent part: 
 
  (k) Liability of directors and officers 
 
  A director or officer of an insured 
depository institution may be held personally 
liable for monetary damages in any civil 
action by, on behalf of, or at the request or 
direction of the Corporation, which action is 
prosecuted wholly or partially for the 
benefit of the Corporation . . . for gross 
negligence, including any similar conduct or 
  
FIRREA, "the term `insured depository institution' means any bank 
or savings association the deposits of which are insured by the 
[Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation pursuant to this 
chapter."  12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (emphasis added).  Thus, that 
Congress has spoken directly in section 1821(k)'s substantive 
provision to the standard of liability for the directors and 
officers of all failed federally-insured depository institutions, 
including those with a federal charter is, I believe, not open to 
question. 
 I also do not share the majority's confidence in the 
clarity of the savings clause.21  Beginning its analysis by 
inquiring whether any terms of section 1821(k) "`explicitly 
preserv[e] or preempt[] judge-made law[]'", the majority "read[s] 
the plain meaning of th[e] savings clause as preserving the RTC's 
                                                                  
conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard 
of a duty of care (than gross negligence) 
including intentional tortious conduct, as 
such terms are defined and determined under 
applicable State law.  Nothing in this 
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of 
the Corporation under other applicable law. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(k). 
    
21
 I could not discern the meaning of the savings clause 
without reference to section 1821(k)'s legislative history.  In 
my view, the savings clause ensures that even though state 
insulating statutes are preempted, state law which imposes a 
higher standard than section 1821(k)'s gross negligence liability 
standard, holding directors and officers liable for simple 
negligence, remains available to the RTC.   See supra pp. 9-10. 
  
right to proceed against directors and officers of federally-
chartered institutions under federal common law."  Majority Op. 
at 32-33.  This interpretation of the savings clause, however, 
has been rejected by our sister courts as contrary to elementary 
canons of statutory construction.  They have concluded that if 
the savings clause were construed to preserve federal common law 
actions for simple negligence, then the language of the 
substantive sentence of section 1821(k) which specifically 
enunciates a cause of action for gross negligence would be 
meaningless surplusage and rendered a nullity.  I agree.  RTC v. 
Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 
1357, 1361-62 (5th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 420 
(7th Cir. 1993).  See RTC v.Frates, ___ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. 1995) 
[1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7990 at 4].  ("[W]e believe Ga[l]agher, 
Miramon, and Bates have correctly resolved the [federal common 
law displacement] issue . . . and we see no reason to depart from 
or add to the analysis . . . .").   
 To avoid this dilemma, the majority informs us that 
section 1821(k) does not address the liability of directors and 
officers of federally-chartered depository institutions in RTC 
actions and was enacted only to preempt state insulating 
statutes.  I have difficulty comprehending how section 1821(k) 
can preserve the RTC's right to sue the directors and officers of 
federal financial institutions for simple negligence under 
federal common law, and at the same time, not address the 
  
liability of these individuals in RTC actions.  The majority 
cannot have it both ways; either section 1821(k) addresses the 
issue or it does not.22  
  The majority's position that section 1821(k)'s 
"intended realm" is limited to state chartered depository 
institutions, Majority Op. at 44, flies in the face of FIRREA's 
applicable definitional provisions.  As noted, section 1821(k) 
covers directors and officers of "insured depository 
institution[s]", an all-inclusive term as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 
1813(c)(2).  Subsections 1813(c)(4) and (5), on the other hand, 
distinguish between and define respectively "Federal depository 
institution[s]" and "State depository institution[s]".23  If 
                     
    
22
 I would also disagree with the view that the 
substantive sentence of section 1821(k) speaks only to RTC 
actions against the directors and officers of state institutions 
and the savings clause speaks to RTC actions against the 
directors and officers of both state and federal institutions.  
Neither the statute's language nor its legislative history 
indicates that Congress restricted the subject matter of section 
1821(k)'s first sentence to state institutions, then expanded it 
to include state and federal institutions in the second.  
Further, if section 1821(k)'s substantive provision only concerns 
state insulating statutes, federal common law need not be 
"preserved".  Finally, "other applicable law" in the savings 
clause cannot refer to federal common law if the substantive 
provision relates only to actions involving state institutions, 
because federal common law does not have a place in such actions. 
    
23
 Subsections 1813(c)(4) and (5) provide: 
 
 (4) Federal depository institution 
 
  The term "Federal depository institution" 
means any national bank, any Federal savings 
association, and any Federal branch. 
 
  
section 1821(k) was intended to apply only to state institutions, 
Congress would have referred in the statute to insured "State 
depository institution[s]".  Indeed, when Congress sought to 
restrict the application of section 1821's subsections to state 
institutions, it did so explicitly by using the appropriate term.  
E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(3)(A) ("Whenever the authority having 
supervision of any insured State depository institution . . . 
appoints a conservator . . . the Corporation may accept such 
appointment.")(emphasis added). 
 Moreover, the majority's position that section 
1821(k)'s scope is limited to state institutions is premised on 
what I believe to be an erroneous interpretation of the statute.  
The majority states that since "gross negligence" does not have a 
"generally accepted meaning", Majority Op. at 36, had Congress 
intended to speak directly to the standard of liability for 
directors and officers of federally chartered institutions it 
would have clarified which formulation of gross negligence 
applies in such cases.24  In addition, the majority concludes 
                                                                  
 (5) State depository institution 
 
  The term "State depository institution" means 
any State bank, any State savings 
association, and any insured branch which is 
not a Federal branch. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(4),(5). 
    
24
 In making this point, the majority cites FDIC v. 
McSweeny, 976 F.2d 532, 539 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2440 (1993), and FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 
433, 447 (10th Cir. 1992).  In these cases, the courts concluded 
  
that a federal statutory gross negligence standard and section 
1821(k)'s reference in the first sentence to "applicable State 
law" cannot co-exist.  I do not find them mutually exclusive, and 
read the statute as directing the courts to define "gross 
negligence" in cases involving failed federal depository 
institutions by the state law that has the closest connection to 
the institution at issue.  Congress has, at various times and in 
various contexts, enacted statutes which rely upon state laws of 
decision in an overall federal statutory scheme.  In re TMI 
Litigation Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 855 (3d Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992).25  Concepts of negligence fall 
                                                                  
that section 1821(k) does not preempt state law claims for simple 
negligence, viewing the statute's reliance on state law for the 
definition of gross negligence as directly refuting the 
proposition that FIRREA establishes a uniform, national standard 
of gross negligence liability.  Id. 
 
 Since its decision in Canfield, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit has held that section 1821(k) supplants federal 
common law.  RTC v. Frates, ___ F.3d ___ (10th Cir. 1995) [1995 
U.S. App. LEXIS 7990]  
    
25
 Examples of federal statutes that explicitly authorize 
the use of state law include:  the Price-Anderson Amendments Act 
of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (the "substantive rules for 
decision" in public liability actions "shall be derived from" the 
law of the state in which the nuclear incident occurs); the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred determines the liability of 
the United States); 16 U.S.C. § 457 (claims for death or personal 
injury within a federal enclave are governed by laws of the 
state); the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 
1333(2)(A) (the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent state 
are the law of the United States regarding the Outer Continental 
Shelf's subsoil and seabed).  At times, the use of state law in a 
federal scheme is a matter of congressional intent.  See, e.g., 
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 
  
squarely within the province of the state courts and the conduct 
that rises to the level of gross negligence may vary from place 
to place.  Thus, a direction from Congress to look for guidance 
to the law of the locality in which a federally chartered 
depository institution is based represents a sensible and 
reasonable way to determine the parameters of the gross 
negligence liability standard in any given case.   
          I therefore read the plain meaning of section 1821(k) 
as "speaking directly" to the standard of liability applicable in 
suits brought by the RTC against the directors and officers of 
federally chartered insured depository institutions, and setting 
it at gross negligence.      
           
 II. 
 When I look for legislative history that contradicts 
section 1821(k)'s plain meaning as I see it, I find none; and in 
fact, I find legislative history showing that Congress had before 
it several competing concerns when enacting section 1821(k) which 
it resolved in favor of a gross negligence liability standard.   
          Congress was aware that a number of states had enacted 
legislation that shields directors and officers from liability 
except for reckless or willful breaches of duty in order to 
                                                                  
(1946) (Congress intended that state law define "real property" 
for tax purposes under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
Act.). 
  
persuade capable individuals to accept corporate directorships.  
Finding an intentional tort standard of liability unacceptably 
high, Congress enacted section 1821(k) with at least the purpose 
in mind to preempt state insulating statutes.  RTC v. Miramon, 22 
F.3d 1357, 1363 n.9 (5th Cir. 1994).  At the same time, however, 
Congress was not prepared to displace all state law.  Thus, the 
evolution of section 1821(k) from preliminary to final form was 
toward less preemption, FDIC v. McSweeny, 976 F.2d 532, 540 (9th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2440 (1993), 
with Congress ultimately leaving it, through the savings clause, 
to each state to decide whether a simple negligence standard is 
appropriate within its own borders.26   
 While Congress sought to set a standard of liability in 
section 1821(k) that provided federal regulators with adequate 
enforcement power, Pub.L. No. 101-73, § 101(9)-(10), 103 Stat. 
183, 187 (1989), it also understood the importance of attracting 
qualified persons to serve as officers and directors of financial 
institutions.27   RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 422 (7th Cir. 
                     
    
26
 During the floor debate in the Senate on the managers' 
amendment to the Senate's original bill, Senator Riegle, the 
bill's sponsor, explained that the amended bill sought to limit 
the preemptive scope of section 1821(k) to state insulating 
statutes.  See Majority Op. at 20. 
    
27
 The remarks of Senator Sanford during the floor debate 
on the managers' amendment indicate that Congress was concerned 
that financial institutions be able to attract competent 
management: 
 
  Mr. President, I would like to thank the 
distinguished managers of the bill, Senator 
  
1993).  Accordingly, the standard of liability to be included in 
the statute -- simple or gross negligence -- was a matter of 
debate.  While the Senate's initial bill would have allowed the 
RTC to bring claims "for any cause of action available at common 
law, including but not limited to, negligence, gross negligence, 
willful misconduct, breach of fiduciary duty . . . .", S.774, § 
                                                                  
RIEGLE and Senator GARN, for including in the 
managers' amendment modifications to the bill 
regarding directors and officers liability 
insurance contracts, surety bond, and 
financial institution bond contracts, and 
provisions relating to State laws affecting 
the liability of officers and directors of 
financial institutions. 
 
  I believe that these changes are essential if 
we are to attract qualified officers and 
directors to serve in our financial 
institutions.   
 
135 Cong.Rec. S4276-77 (daily ed. April 19, 1989).  
 
 During this same debate, Senator Heflin noted the need for 
changes in the Senate bill to "ensure that financial institutions 
are able to attract strong and capable individuals as directors 
and officers[]", and Senator Riegle agreed.  Id. at S4264-65.  
Although Senator Heflin's comments were made in connection with 
modifications to FIRREA's "standard for imposition of civil 
penalties" provision, now codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2), I, 
unlike the majority, believe that the Senator's statements 
further our understanding of section 1821(k).  The Supreme Court 
has counseled that "`[t]he true meaning of a single section of a 
statute . . ., however precise its language, cannot be 
ascertained if it be considered apart from related sections. . . 
.'"  Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 223 (1984), quoting 
Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934).  See also 
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) ("We believe it 
fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in 
isolation from the context of the whole Act . . . ."). 
  
214(n), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 105-106 (calendar N. 45, April 
13, 1989), its amended version removed, inter alia, all 
references to a simple negligence standard: 
 [A director or officer of an insured 
financial institution may be held personally 
liable] for gross negligence, or intentional 
conduct, as those terms are defined and 
determined under applicable State law.  
Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or 
affect any right, if any, of the [FDIC] that 
may have existed immediately prior to the 
enactment of the [FIRREA] Act. 
 
135 Cong.Rec. S4452 (daily ed. April 19, 1989).28  
                     
    
28
 The majority relies exclusively on the following Senate 
Report as demonstrative of Congress' intent to "explicitly 
preserve[] any federal remedy for conduct violating a lower 
standard of care, such as simple negligence[]", Majority Op. at 
34-35: 
 
 [Section 1821(k)] enables the FDIC to pursue 
claims against directors or officers of 
insured financial institutions for gross 
negligence (or negligent conduct that 
demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of 
care than gross negligence) or for 
intentional tortious conduct.  This right 
supersedes State law limitations that, if 
applicable, would bar or impede such claims.  
This subsection[] does not prevent the FDIC 
from pursuing claims under State law or under 
other applicable Federal Law, if such law 
permits the officers or directors of a 
financial institution to be sued (1) for 
violating a lower standard of care, such as 
simple negligence, or (2) on an alternative 
theory such as breach of contract or breach 
of fiduciary duty . . . . 
 
S.Rep. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong.Rec. 6912 (daily 
ed. June 19, 1989). 
 
  
 Commenting in favor of the amended bill, Senator 
Sanford unmistakenly articulated Congress' intent to establish a 
standard of liability of gross negligence in section 1821(k) and 
clarified that the standard Congress enacted for actions brought 
under the statute was not intended for other cases: 
  While I fundamentally believe that 
issues of corporate governance and the 
standard of care to which corporate officers 
and directors should be held are matters of 
State law, not Fed[e]ral law, the preemption 
of State law permitted by this bill is 
limited solely to those institutions that 
have Federal deposit insurance and to those 
cases in which the directors of officers have 
committed intentional torts or acts of gross 
negligence.  As such, the establishment of a 
federal standard of care is based on the 
overriding Federal interest in protecting the 
soundness of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation fund and is very limited in 
scope.  It is not a wholesale preemption of 
longstanding principles of corporate 
governance, nor does it represent a major 
step in the direction of establishing Federal 
tort standards or Federal standards of care 
of corporate officers and directors. 
 
                                                                  
 If this were the only item of legislative history before us, 
I would find the majority's position more persuasive.  When I 
consider the Report in context, however, I do not believe it 
supports the majority's position.  The Report was prepared by the 
Senate Banking Committee that drafted the Senate's original bill.  
Due to the press of time, it was not placed in the Congressional 
Record until two months after the Senate voted on and passed the 
amended bill.  Id. at S6934.  As noted, the original bill was 
modified substantially to delete references to simple negligence.  
I therefore question the Report's value.  RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 
1357, 1362 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[E]xamination of all of the 
legislative history, and scrutiny of the sequence of events 
leading up to the bill's passage, calls into question the 
conclusion of th[e] report."). 
  
Id. at S4264-65.29 
 
          The House version of section 1821(k), passed after the 
Senate version, H.R. 1278, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong.Rec. 
H2602 (daily ed. June 15, 1989), and the version that was 
ultimately voted into law, preserved the Senate's removal of the 
simple negligence standard.  See Pub.L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 
(Aug. 9, 1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86.  The House-
Senate Conference Report which represents the final statement of 
terms agreed upon by both Houses of Congress confirms that 
Congress decided upon a gross negligence standard for section 
1821(k): 
 Title II preempts State law with respect to 
claims brought by the FDIC in any capacity 
against officers or directors of an insured 
depository institution.  The preemption 
allows the FDIC to pursue claims for gross 
negligence or any conduct that demonstrates a 
                     
    
29
 The majority also points to Senator Sanford's comments 
for support.  While the Senator's comments certainly demonstrate 
that section 1821(k) was not intended to set a universal standard 
of director and officer liability, I do not believe they support 
the view that Congress did not address the standard of liability 
to be used in this RTC action. 
 
 Further, I believe the Senator's comments cast doubt on the 
majority's statement that "[e]ven assuming that the proper 
characterization of preexisting federal common law standard (as 
one of negligence or gross negligence) is unclear, it seems quite 
unlikely that Congress would have intended to reformulate the 
post-receivership standard as gross negligence, while leaving the 
pre-receivership standard in a state of ambiguity."  Majority Op. 
at 37.  It appears that when enacting section 1821(k), Congress 
did not focus on the duty of care that directors and officers of 
financial institutions may owe their shareholders or third 
parties in pre-receivership situations or on duties of care in 
other areas. 
  
greater disregard of a duty of care, 
including intentional tortious conduct. 
 
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 222, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 393, 398 (1989), 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 437. 
          Events which occurred after the statute's enactment 
also confirm that Congress established a standard of liability 
greater than simple negligence in section 1821(k).  I recognize 
that post-enactment legislative history is not as weighty as 
legislative history that is contemporaneous with a statute's 
passage, but as the Supreme Court has instructed, I would "be 
remiss" to ignore it.  Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 
677, 687 n. 7 (1979).  There were two unsuccessful efforts to 
amend section 1821(k) to include a simple negligence standard of 
liability, one by the FDIC,30 and the other by Congressman Baker 
of Louisiana.31  Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 423.  Only the presence of 
                     
    
30
 The FDIC amendment provided: 
 
 Nothing in this subsection shall impair or affect 
any right of the [RTC] under other applicable 
State or Federal law, including a right to 
hold such director or officer personally 
liable for negligence. 
 
Miramon, 27 F.3d at 1363 n.10.  
    
31
 The Baker amendment provided: 
 
 Paragraph (1) shall not be construed as impairing 
or affecting any right of the . . . [RTC] 
under any provision of applicable State or 
other Federal law, including any provision of 
common law or any law establishing the 
personal liability of any director or officer 
  
a gross negligence standard in section 1821(k) would have 
precipitated these attempts to reintroduce simple negligence as a 
standard in the statute.  Further, had Congress preserved the  
federal common law standard in section 1821(k), as the majority 
contends, these amendments would not have been necessary. 
 Finally, the public policy consideration the majority 
raises regarding the "perverse incentive" that would be created 
if the pre-receivership liability standard is simple negligence 
and the post-receivership standard is higher, Majority Op. at 37, 
may be more imagined than real.  I have no reason to believe that 
the directors and officers of federal depository institutions 
will allow their institutions to fail in order to take advantage 
of section 1821(k)'s gross negligence standard.  If, however, the 
statute has this result, it flows from the statute as written, 
which is for Congress to correct. FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of 
Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 846 (3d Cir. 1994) (declining to amend 
CERCLA by "judicial fiat"). 
 
 III.  
 In my judgment, the only reading of section 1821(k) 
consistent with its plain meaning and its legislative history is 
                                                                  
of an insured depository institution under 
any standard pursuant to such law. 
 
H.R. 3435, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 228 (Comm. Markup Oct. 18, 
1991). 
  
that the statute "speaks directly" to the standard of liability 
applicable to the directors and officers of state and federal 
federally-insured depository institutions in RTC actions.  I 
must, therefore, conclude that the federal common law in this 
area is supplanted.  Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313-16 
(1984). 
 
 
 
 
 
